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Abstract
We build a novel stochastic dynamic regional integrated assessment model
(IAM) of the climate and economic system including a number of important
climate science elements that are missing in most IAMs. These elements are
spatial heat transport from the Equator to the Poles, sea level rise, permafrost
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thaw and tipping points. We study optimal policies under cooperation and
noncooperation between two regions (the North and the Tropic-South) in the
face of risks and recursive utility. We introduce a new general computational
algorithm to find feedback Nash equilibrium. Our results suggest that when
the elements of climate science are ignored, important policy variables such as
the optimal regional carbon tax and adaptation could be seriously biased. We
also find the regional carbon tax is significantly smaller in the feedback Nash
equilibrium than in the social planner’s problem in each region, and the North
has higher carbon taxes than the Tropic-South.
Keywords: Integrated Assessment Model, spatial heat transport, carbon
taxes, adaptation, sea level rise, stochastic tipping points, Epstein-Zin prefer-
ences, feedback Nash equilibrium
JEL Classification: Q54, Q58, C61, C63, C68, C73
1 Introduction
A major characteristic of leading integrated assessment models (IAMs) such as RICE-
2010 (Nordhaus, 2010) or DICE-2016 (Nordhaus, 2017) is that the geophysical sector
of the model determines the mean surface temperature through the carbon cycle,
which in turn determines the damage function. Thus damages are related to the
mean surface temperature of the planet.
A well-established fact in the science of climate change, however, is that when the
climate cools or warms, high latitude regions tend to exaggerate the changes seen at
lower latitudes (e.g., Langen and Alexeev, 2007; IPCC, 2013). This effect is called
polar amplification (PA) and indicates that, under global warming, the temperature
at the latitudes closer to the Poles will increase faster than at latitudes nearer to
the Equator. PA is especially strong in the Arctic and is sometimes called “Arctic
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amplification”. For example, Bekryaev et al. (2010) document a high-latitude (greater
than 60 °N) warming rate of 1.36 degrees centigrade per century from 1875 to 2008.
This trend is almost twice that of the Northern Hemisphere trend of 0.79 degrees
centigrade per century.
Spatial heat and moisture transport, and the resulting PA, suggest that a better
representation of the climate science underlying IAMs would be a geophysical sector
structure which accounts for these phenomena. This implies that, in the IAM output,
the surface temperature anomaly will be differentiated across spatial zones of the
globe. The spatial temperature differentiation is important for the economics of
climate change because it provides the impact of PA on the structure of the economic
damages. PA will accelerate the loss of Arctic sea ice, which in turn has consequences
for melting land ice that is associated with a potential meltdown of the Greenland
and West Antarctica ice sheets which could cause serious global sea level rise (SLR).
Another source of damage associated with PA relates to the thawing of the per-
mafrost, which is expected to bring about widespread changes in ecosystems and
damage to infrastructure, along with release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) which exist
in permafrost carbon stocks (see, e.g., IPCC, 2013; Schuur et al., 2015). Further-
more, recent studies suggest that Arctic amplification might increase the frequency
of extreme weather events (Cohen et al., 2018), although this remains a controversial
issue (Overland and Wang, 2018).
The well-known “burning embers” diagram in Lenton and Schellnhuber (2007)
shows the ranking of tipping elements by order of proximity to the present time.
The “nearest” three potential tipping points are located in the high latitudes of the
Northern Hemisphere (Arctic summer sea ice loss, Greenland ice sheet melt and bo-
real forest loss). Because of PA in the Arctic, each degree increase in planetary yearly
mean temperature leads to approximately two degrees increase in the Arctic lati-
3
tudes. Thus natural phenomena occurring in high latitudes, due to spatial heat and
moisture transport, can cause economic damages in lower latitudes. These spatial
impacts, which could have important implications for climate change policies, are not
embodied in the current generation of IAMs. The RICE model (Nordhaus, 2010) –
the regional version of DICE (Nordhaus, 2017) – still treats the climate system by
using the globally averaged measure of temperature and neglects heat and moisture
transport and especially PA.
Hassler and Krusell (2012) extend Golosov et al. (2014) to multi-regions. While
their work is elegant, as is that of Golosov et al. (2014), they do not deal with pole-
ward heat transport, multi-layer carbon cycles, separation of atmospheric and oceanic
layers, and regional tipping points, as we do here. van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (2016)
and Jaakkola and van der Ploeg (2018) develop interesting two-region models with
tipping points that deal explicitly with non-cooperative and cooperative institutional
structures. But they do not include geographic specification of regions, poleward
heat transport, recursive preferences, or the more realistic multi-layer modeling of
the carbon cycle and the temperature response to anthropogenic forcing as we have.
Thus neither they nor Golosov et al. (2014) and Hassler and Krusell (2012) are able
to study the effects of different values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(IES) and risk aversion parameters, or the effects of neglecting poleward heat trans-
port on regional carbon taxes, as we are able to do with our richer and more realistic
modeling of the interaction between climate dynamics and economic dynamics.
Another very recent IAM model of Krusell and Smith (2017) deals with space at
a much finer scale than the present paper and contrasts market structures, including
autarky and full borrowing and lending. However, their model does not address
issues related to heat and moisture transport, SLR, permafrost thaw and the impacts
of tipping points, as we do here. Thus we feel that our work is complementary to
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that of Krusell and Smith (2017) and not competitive. As mentioned above, one
novel contribution of the present paper is to develop an IAM which incorporates
spatial impacts associated with heat and moisture transport, along with treatment of
uncertainty and tipping points. As far as we know, no other IAM treats these issues
as we do here.
The stochastic IAM developed in this paper is a complex two-regional model with
a more realistic – relative to existing models – geophysical sector and its solution re-
quires the use of advanced numerical methods. Thus we adapt computational methods
related to the DSICE model of Cai et al. (forthcoming). The DSICE framework is
a stochastic generalization of DICE, which does not take into account the heat and
moisture transport dynamics of the climate system. We adapt DSICE by disaggre-
gating the globe into regions. However, DSICE is only a social planner’s model and
its computational method is for solving social planner’s problems. Besides a social
planner’s model, we also study feedback Nash equilibrium in this paper, and we de-
velop a new general computational method to solve the high-dimensional dynamic
stochastic game (with ten continuous state variables and one discrete state variable)
with recursive utility.
Most IAMs are based on a social planner’s problem assuming that all countries are
cooperative and the social planner can allocate resources without border frictions, so
they can just provide a polar solution as there are very few unselfish sovereigns in the
real world. It would be interesting if we can find another polar solution under a non-
cooperative Nash equiloibrium. To our best knowledge, van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw
(2016) and Jaakkola and van der Ploeg (2018) are the only work in finding optimal
climate policy under noncooperation. However, van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (2016)
just solve an open-loop Nash equilibrium whose optimal decisions depend on time and
the initial state only; Jaakkola and van der Ploeg (2018) solve a symmetric feedback
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Nash equilibrium (FBNE) under a low-dimensional continuous-time model using the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation method, but in most cases FBNE is not symmet-
ric. This paper is the first to numerically find optimal climate policy under both
the social planner’s cooperative world and (asymmetrical) FBNE under a realistic
discrete-time dynamic stochastic model with more than ten continuous state vari-
ables.
We call our model a Dynamic Integration of Regional Economy and Spatial Cli-
mate under Uncertainty (DIRESCU).1 In developing DIRESCU, we follow the two-
region approach of Langen and Alexeev (2007) but change their regions as follows:
region 1 is the region north of latitude 30°N to 90°N (called the North), while region
2 is the region from latitude 90°S (the South Pole) to 30°N (called the Tropic-South).
Heat and moisture transport take place northbound from the tropical belt of latitudes
north of the Equator which are included in the Tropic-South toward the North.2
The interaction of the geophysical sector of DIRESCU with the economic sector
is reflected in the damage function. We introduce separate damage functions in each
region and allow for damages in the Tropic-South to be caused by an increase in
temperature (i.e., PA) in the North. For example, the increased amplification of the
temperature anomaly in the high north latitudes increases the hazard rate of tipping
events in the high north latitudes toward earlier arrival times. Hence any associated
1Brock and Xepapadeas (2017) considered a simple deterministic model and showed that, by
ignoring spatial heat and moisture transport and the resulting PA, the regulator may overestimate
or underestimate the tax on GHG emissions. The structure of their economic model is, however,
simplified and this makes it difficult to discuss realistic policy options.
2There is transport toward the South Pole from all latitudes south of the Equator in the Tropic-
South which we do not take into account in order to ease the computational burden by reducing the
number of dimensions in our model and at the same time include the Southern Hemisphere economies.
Scientific evidence suggests that PA in Antarctica is weaker than in the Arctic, because of weaker
surface albedo feedback and more efficient ocean uptake in the Southern Ocean, in combination
with Antarctic ozone depletion. Thus, for the time horizon of 100 years in which our solutions are
focused, the majority of the effects of heat transfer should be associated with heat transfer toward
the North Pole, and then we adopted the approximation of unifying the Southern Hemisphere with
the 0°-30°N belt and northbound heat transfer.
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damages caused to lower latitudes by warming in the higher north latitudes, e.g.,
increased melting of land ice leading to SLR damages in the lower latitudes, will be
increased by PA, even though the high northern latitudes may benefit from additional
warming.
The rest of the economic module is based on a two-region differentiation of DICE-
2016 (Nordhaus, 2017). We model the economic interactions between the regions with
an adjustment cost function, and we allow for adaptation expenses in each region.
Krusell and Smith (2017) compare the two market structures of complete autarky and
full international borrowing and lending and find that the market structures do not
have a large impact on their results. While we can study autarky as Krusell and Smith
(2017) do by raising the cost of interaction to induce autarky, our formulation of
economic interactions does not include the case of full borrowing and lending as in
their model. We have ignored serious modeling of market structure in order to focus
on some elements of geophysics that are ignored in other contributions, including
that of Krusell and Smith (2017). We do this to provide new insights regarding
the importance of spatial heat and moisture transport phenomena in climate change
policy.
The present paper innovates relative to popular IAMs at the tractable level of
complexity in the literature (e.g., Nordhaus’s DICE and RICE models, the even more
complex DSICE model and many others) in a number of ways. In particular, (i) we
incorporate an endogenous SLR module, an endogenous permafrost melt module and,
especially, we add the more realistic geophysics of spatial heat and moisture transport
from low latitudes to high latitudes, while keeping the three-layer carbon cycle of
DICE and RICE, and expanding the two-layer temperature module of DICE and
RICE to a three-layer module; (ii) We introduce recursive preferences and we consider
a wide range of parameter values of risk aversion and IES; (iii) We allow for adaptation
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to regional damage from SLR and temperature increase;3 (iv) Our paper goes beyond
the single-region DSICE model by developing a new general computational method
to numerically solve a dynamic stochastic FBNE of two regions.
We calibrate our many parameter values to match history as well as to fit the
representative concentration pathway (RCP) scenarios (Meinshausen et al., 2011b).
The main results of this paper are summarized below.
First, stochastic processes of regional carbon taxes are derived and various uncer-
tainty fan charts are presented and compared with and without heat and moisture
transport as well as for a range of risk aversion and IESs, under cooperation and non-
cooperation between regions. Moreover, the North has much higher regional carbon
taxes than the Tropic-South. Our figures and tables provide a much more thorough
quantification of the multitude of types of uncertainties than the received regional
IAM literature at the DICE/RICE level of complexity.
Second, the non-cooperative dynamic stochastic game between the regions leads
to much lower regional carbon taxes than the social planner’s model with economic
interactions between the regions. If the economy in each region is closed, then the
social planner’s model has much larger regional carbon taxes and much larger surface
temperature increases than in the case with economic interactions.
Third, neglecting heat and moisture transport as in RICE and other regional
IAMs that do not account for this added geophysics leads to many biases, including
inaccurate forecasting of the first time of arrival of potential tipping points located
3The importance of relating damages from temperature increase to adaptation has been em-
phasized by, for example, Barreca et al. (2016) who showed remarkable reduction of damages to
morbidity and mortality due to heat stress in the U.S. after the introduction of technologies such
as air conditioning. Another example is Burgess et al. (2014) who showed large negative effects
of extreme heat days in India, especially in rural areas. Since lack of access to air conditioning
is a difference between India and the U.S., these results suggest that because many areas in the
Tropic-South are poorer than the North, we might expect adaptation such as introduction of air
conditioning to be slower in the Tropic-South than in the wealthier parts of the North.
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in the high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere. The low (high) latitude regions
would be hotter (colder) if poleward heat transport were absent, hence damages in
the low latitude regions would be higher, since they are already under heat stress
and transporting some of that heat poleward helps relieve this heat stress. For ex-
ample, solutions without heat transport will underestimate what actual heat-related
damage there is in the North, and overestimate the actual heat-related damage in
the Tropic-South. Without heat transport, the adaptation rates in the North will
be underestimated as its corresponding atmospheric temperature anomaly is under-
estimated, and the adaptation rates in the Tropic-South will be overestimated as its
corresponding atmospheric temperature anomaly is overestimated.
Fourth, endogenous SLR and adaptation are important new contributions of our
modeling. In this way we capture the projected increased diversion into adapting to
SLR (e.g., spending resources on SLR-protective infrastructure). The projected ear-
lier arrival of increased melting of land ice in the Northern Hemisphere high latitudes
due to our inclusion of heat transport means a potential increase in SLR damages in
coastal low latitude areas relative to the projections when heat transport is ignored.
Ignoring SLR underestimates the regional carbon taxes significantly, and ignoring
adaptation overestimates the regional carbon taxes significantly.
Fifth, the optimal regional carbon taxes for both regions tend to be larger for
larger IES values for climate tipping risks, in a cooperative or non-cooperative world.
This is consistent with empirical findings in finance that greater IESs in Epstein–Zin
recursive preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989) imply that long-term risk matters and
carbon taxes are larger.4 This result is also consistent with the findings in the DSICE
model Cai et al. (forthcoming).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds DIRESCU. We calibrate our
4See Bansal and Yaron (2004) for financial risks, and Bansal et al. (2016) for climate risks.
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spatial climate system and the economic system using DICE and RICE, as well as data
from other literature such as IPCC (2013). Section 3 discusses the social planner’s
problem and the regional feedback Nash equilibrium under climate tipping risk and
Epstein–Zin preferences to address the smoothness of consumption across time and
risk aversion. Section 4 introduces our new computational method to solve FBNE for
a general dynamic game. Section 5 discusses the results of the DIRESCU model and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Model Setup
The deterministic version of our DIRESCU model follows DICE-2016 (Nordhaus,
2017), which maximizes social welfare with trade-offs between carbon dioxide (CO2)
abatement, consumption and investment. Our model has been augmented with an
additional control, relative to DICE-2016, by including adaptation to climate change
following de Bruin et al. (2009). DIRESCU has two regions: the first one (indexed
with i = 1) is the North from latitude 30°N to 90°N and the second one (indexed with
i = 2) is the Tropic-South from latitude 90°S to 30°N. We first model it as a social
planner problem with both economic and climate interaction between two regions,
SLR, permafrost thaw and climate tipping risks (in the deterministic model, the risks
are ignored). We then change it to a dynamic stochastic game and solve its feedback
Nash equilibrium. The big picture of the model setup is depicted in Figure 1 and its
details are described below.
2.1 The Climate System
The climate system contains four modules: the carbon cycle, the temperature system,
SLR and permafrost thaw. In our calibration of the climate system, we use the
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Figure 1: The DIRESCU model
four RCP scenarios (i.e., RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6, and RCP8.5) (Meinshausen et al.,
2011b) and DICE/RICE optimal scenarios (i.e., the optimal solutions of DICE-2016
and RICE-2010 with optimal mitigation policy), where we define each scenario as
a combination of pathways of global emissions, atmospheric carbon concentration,
global radiative forcing, and globally averaged surface temperature relative to 1900
levels. For the RCP scenarios, the pathways of atmospheric carbon concentration,
global radiative forcing, and globally averaged surface temperature are generated from
the software MAGICC (Meinshausen et al., 2011a), using the corresponding pathways
of global emissions as the input to the software. The pathways of global emissions are
provided by MAGICC too. Appendix A.2 shows that our calibrated system fits these
scenarios, history, as well as other data in the literature such as regional temperature
projections reported in IPCC (2013).
2.1.1 Carbon Cycle
We follow DICE-2016 in using three-layer carbon concentrations: atmospheric carbon,
carbon in the upper ocean and carbon in the deep ocean. LetMt = (M
AT
t ,M
UO
t ,M
DO
t )
⊤
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represent the carbon concentration in the atmosphere, the upper ocean and the deep
ocean. Then the three-layer carbon cycle system can be represented as:
Mt+1 = ΦMMt + (Et, 0, 0)
⊤ , (1)
where Et is global carbon emissions (billions of metric tons) and
ΦM =

1− φ12 φ21
φ12 1− φ21 − φ32 φ32
φ23 1− φ32
 .
The parameters φij are calibrated against the four RCP scenarios and the DICE-2016
optimal scenario. For every scenario, we can use its pathway of emissions as the input
Et to our carbon cycle system (1). Our carbon cycle provides as output a pathway
of atmospheric carbon concentration for each scenario. We calibrate a unique set of
values for φij so that the pathways of atmospheric carbon concentration are close to
the scenarios’ pathways of atmospheric carbon concentration, for all scenarios.
2.1.2 Temperature Subsystem
The global radiative forcing representing the impact of CO2 concentrations on the
surface temperature of the globe (watts per square meter from 1900) is
Ft = η log2
(
MATt /M
AT
∗
)
+ FEXt , (2)
where η = 3.68 as in DICE-2016 and FEXt is the global exogenous radiative forcing.
We use Tt = (T
AT
t,1 , T
AT
t,2 , T
OC
t )
⊤ to represent the temperature anomaly (relative
to 1900 levels) in the atmosphere (two regions) and the global ocean. Thus, the
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temperature system is
Tt+1 = ΦTTt + ξ1 (Ft, Ft, 0)
⊤ , (3)
where we assume that the global radiative forcing has the same effect on both regions,
and
ΦT =

1− ξ2 − ξ4 − ξ6 ξ4 + ξ5 ξ2
ξ4 1− ξ2 − ξ4 − ξ5 − ξ6 ξ2
ξ3 ξ3 1− 2ξ3
 .
In transition equation (3) and transition matrix ΦT, the parameter ξ1 is the tem-
perature increase for each unit of radiative forcing, ξ2 and ξ3 represent transport
between atmosphere and ocean, ξ4 and ξ5 are used to capture spatial heat and mois-
ture transport, and ξ6 represents the sensitivity of the outgoing long-wave radiation
to atmospheric temperature changes.
Similarly to the calibration of the carbon cycle, we calibrate ξ1, ..., ξ6 against the
RCP scenarios, the DICE-2016 optimal scenario, and the historical spatial tempera-
tures in 1900-2015 from the Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISTEMP Team,
2018). For each scenario, we use its pathway of radiative forcing as the input Ft
to our temperature system (3), which provides as output two regional pathways of
atmospheric temperatures in the regions. Then we average the regional pathways
to generate a globally averaged atmospheric temperature pathway. We calibrate a
unique set of values for ξ1, ..., ξ6 so that the generated globally averaged atmospheric
temperature pathways from our temperature system are close to the pathways of
globally averaged atmospheric temperature for all scenarios and, at the same time,
our regional temperatures in 2081-2100 are also close to the projected regional tem-
peratures in 2081-2100 provided in IPCC (2013).
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2.1.3 Sea Level Rise
Sea level rise is a serious problem caused by global warming. Table 4.1 of IPCC
(2013) shows that, if the whole Greenland ice sheet melts, it will cause more than 7
meters (m) global mean SLR, and if the whole Antarctic ice sheet melts, it will lead to
about 58 m global mean SLR. Moreover, once an ice sheet collapses, it is irreversible
for millennia even if forcing is reversed (IPCC 2013, Table 12.4). Nerem et al. (2018)
adduce evidence that SLR is accelerating from the historical data. Table 13.5 of IPCC
(2013) shows SLR in 2100 ranging from about 0.44 m for RCP2.6 to about 0.74 m
for RCP8.5. Figure 13.14 of IPCC (2013) shows that the likely range of SLR is from
1 to 3 m per degree Celsius of globally averaged surface temperature increase if the
warming is sustained for millennia.
There are four main sources of SLR: thermal expansion, and melting of glaciers
and ice cap, the Greenland ice sheet, and the Antarctic ice sheet. The west Antarctic
ice sheet (WAIS) is vulnerable to ocean warming as most of it is below sea level
and extensively exposed to the ocean. The contribution of a complete collapse of the
marine WAIS is estimated at 3.3 m of SLR (Bamber et al., 2009). Thermal expansion
is also due to ocean warming. The melting of glaciers and the Greenland ice sheet
is due to atmospheric warming in the North. Therefore, we assume that the rate
of SLR is dependent on north atmospheric temperature TTAt,1 and ocean temperature
TOCt , and that a higher temperature implies a higher rate of SLR. We also assume
that SLR, St, is irreversible. Thus, we let
St+1 = St + ζ
SLR
1
(
TTAt,1
)ζSLR2 + ζSLR3 TOCt , (4)
where ζSLR1 , ζ
SLR
2 and ζ
SLR
3 are calibrated using the SLR data for four RCP scenarios
in Table 13.5 of IPCC (2013) and Table 1 of Kopp et al. (2014).
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2.1.4 Permafrost Thaw
With global warming, and in particular with PA, a large amount of CO2 and CH4
could be emitted from thawing permafrost in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions, which
contain about 1,700 GtC (gigaton of carbon) in permafrost soils, while about 1,035
GtC are stored in the surface permafrost (0-3 m depth) and could easily be emitted
when they are thawed (Schuur et al., 2015). Schuur et al. (2015) show that an average
carbon release from the permafrost zone by 2100 across models is about 92 GtC with
a standard deviation of 17 GtC under RCP8.5. A higher atmospheric temperature
in the North implies a higher emission rate. Thus, we assume that carbon emission
from thawing permafrost is
EPermt = ζ
Perm
1
(
1−
1
1 + ζPerm2 T
AT
t,1 + ζ
Perm
3
(
TATt,1
)2
)
. (5)
Hope and Schaefer (2016) give a mean carbon emission path from thawing permafrost
for the A1B scenario in IPCC (2007), so we use its annual time series5 to calibrate
ζPerm1 , ζ
Perm
2 and ζ
Perm
3 .
2.2 Climate Tipping Points
There are many uncertainties in the economic and climate system. For example,
DSICE (Cai et al., forthcoming) discusses business cycle shocks in productivity and
climate risks, and also deals with parameter uncertainty over the IES and risk aversion
using uncertainty quantification. Lemoine and Traeger (2014) use a stylized model to
study the impact of climate tipping points. Cai et al. (2016) use DSICE to study the
impact of multiple interacting tipping points on the carbon tax policy. In this paper
5We thank Kevin Schaefer for providing the annual time series data.
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we introduce uncertainty regarding the emergence of endogenous tipping elements in
the North into the spatial model with heat and moisture transport.
We assume that there is a representative tipping element that will take D years
to fully unfold its damage after it occurs. The final damage level is J as a fraction
of output, and the tipping probability depends on the contemporaneous atmospheric
temperature in the North. Let Jt represent the damage level (as a fraction of output)
of the tipping element, and let χt be the indicator representing whether the tipping
event has happened or not before time t, so χt = 0 means that the tipping event
has not happened, and χt = 1 means that it has happened before time t. Thus, the
transition law of Jt is
Jt+1 = min(J, Jt +∆)χt, (6)
where ∆ = J/D is the annual increment of damage level after the tipping happens,
and χt is a Markov chain with the probability transition matrix 1− pt pt
0 1
 ,
where pt is the tipping probability from state χt = 0 to χt = 1. We let pt =
1 − exp
(
−̺max
(
0, TATt,1 − 1
))
,where ̺ is the hazard rate, so a higher atmospheric
temperature in the North implies a higher tipping probability.
We use the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation as the representative
tipping element, and employ its default setup as in Cai et al. (2016), that is, D = 50,
J = 0.15 and ̺ = 0.00063. To introduce a general model, we let
χt+1 = g(χt,Tt, ωt) (7)
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denote the transition law for χt.
2.3 The Economic System
We calibrate our regional economic system to match RICE projections over our re-
gions. Appendix A.3 shows that our calibrated system fits RICE projections.
2.3.1 Production
The gross output at time t in each region is determined by a Cobb-Douglas production
function,
Yt,i ≡ At,iK
α
t,iL
1−α
t,i , (8)
with α = 0.3 and Lt,i the exogenous population at time t and region i aggregated
from RICE.6
We use region-specific total factor productivity (TFP) At,i. Sachs (2001) stresses
ecological specific technical progress and lists five reasons why TFPs in low latitude
zones tend to be smaller than temperate latitude zones. Of course there are excep-
tions, as Sachs points out (e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore and, now, lower latitude
parts of China and parallel parts of “Asian Tigers”). However, theory suggests that
the economies that are “behind” should grow faster than the leaders because the lead-
ers have already done the “heavy lifting” of the TFP R&D which the followers could
presumably copy. For example, Sachs and McArthur (2002) discuss the transition
from “adopter” to “innovator” for countries.
We let At,i = A0,i exp
(
αTFPi
(
1− exp
(
−dTFPi t
))
/dTFPi
)
, where A0,i, α
TFP
i and
6For region i and time t, we sum up population over the RICE subregions located in region i (if
one RICE subregion is located across our border line 30°N, then we give a rough estimate with the
ratio of land of the subregion located in the region i).
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dTFPi are calibrated to match the TFP path in region i which is computed from RICE
by aggregating across the RICE subregions in region i.7
2.3.2 Damages
In the deterministic case of DIRESCU, we consider two types of damages: damages
to output from SLR and damages to output directly from temperature increase.
We follow RICE to let
DSLRt,i = π1,iSt + π2,iS
2
t (9)
reflect the damage from SLR, St, as a fraction of output. We calibrate π1,i and π2,i
to match the damage from SLR which is computed from RICE.8
We follow DICE and RICE to assume a quadratic damage function for temperature
increase
DTt,i = π3,iT
AT
t,i + π4,i(T
AT
t,i )
2, (10)
where π3,i and π4,i are calibrated to fit the aggregated projected damage from surface
temperature change over RICE subregions.9
With the quadratic damage function (10) for the Tropic-South, this region has
damage of only 9% of its output if its regional surface temperature increase is the
same as the global mean surface temperature in 2100 under RCP8.5, i.e., 4.7°C, as
RICE does not take into account catastrophic damages. However, Burke et al. (2015)
show that damages from high temperature increase in low- and mid-latitude regions
7We first estimate Kt,i, Lt,i and Yt,i by summing over those in RICE subregions located in our
region i for each time t, and then compute the TFP paths At,i = Yt,i/(K
α
t,iL
1−α
t,i ) for region i.
8We estimate Yt,i and D
SLR
t,i = D
SLR
t,i Yt,i by summing over those in RICE regions located in our
region i for each time t, and then compute DSLRt,i = D
SLR
t,i /Yt,i for region i. With the data on the SLR
path in RICE and DSLRt,i , we then calibrate π1,i and π2,i so that equation (9) holds approximately.
9We use the radiative forcing path in RICE to estimate TATt,i using our calibrated climate equation
(3). We also estimate Yt,i and D
T
t,i = D
T
t,iYt,i by summing over those in RICE regions located in
our region i for each time t, and then compute DTt,i = D
T
t,i/Yt,i for region i. With the data on T
AT
t,i
and DTt,i, we then calibrate π1,i and π2,i so that equation (10) holds approximately.
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are much higher, reducing projected global output by 23% in 2100 under RCP8.5, with
the poorest 40% of countries (most being in our Tropic-South) having 75% reduction
relative to a world without climate change. Dell et al. (2012) show that there are
large and negative effects of higher temperatures on growth in poor countries, with
about 1.3% economic growth reduction for a 1°C increase. Burke et al. (2015) show
that climate change may lead to negative economic growth for some countries. Our
estimate of damages follows DICE and RICE, that is, damages are proportional to
instantaneous output, not to growth of TFP, so they may be underestimated for the
Tropic-South and overestimated for the North. However, our estimate of damages
to the high-latitude regions may also be underestimated, as we ignored potential
damages from inequality between the regions (Hsiang et al., 2017).
2.3.3 Emissions, Adaptation, and Mitigation
Global carbon emissions at time t are defined as
Et ≡
2∑
i=1
EIndt,i + E
Perm
t + E
Land
t ,
where ELandt is exogenous global carbon emissions from biological processes, E
Perm
t is
emissions from permafrost thawing estimated by equation (5), and EIndt,i = σt,i(1 −
µt,i)Yt,i is industrial emissions, where µt,i is an emission control rate and σt,i is the
carbon intensity in region i. We let
σt,i = σ0,i exp (−α
σ
i (1− exp (−d
σ
i t)) /d
σ
i ) , (11)
where σ0,i, α
σ
i and d
σ
i are calibrated to match the carbon intensity paths in region i
which are computed from RICE by aggregating across the RICE subregions in region
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i.10
We include an adaptation choice variable Pt,i for each region in our model as
in de Bruin et al. (2009). Adaptation reduces damages to output from SLR and
temperature increase. The output net of all damages including SLR, temperature
anomaly and tipping becomes
Yt,i ≡ (1− Jt)Ωt,iYt,i ≡
(1− Jt)Yt,i
1 + (1− Pt,i)(DSLRt,i +D
T
t,i)
. (12)
where Pt,i ∈ [0, 1] is the adaptation rate, and Ωt,i is the damage factor after adap-
tation. We follow de Bruin et al. (2009) to assume that adaptation expenditure is
Υt,i ≡ η1P
η2
t,i Yt,i, with η1 = 0.115 and η2 = 3.6.
We follow DICE to assume that mitigation expenditure is Ψt,i ≡ θ1,t,iµ
θ2
t,iYt,i, where
θ1,t,i is the abatement cost as a fraction of output in region i at time t. We use
the DICE/RICE form to define θ1,t,i = b0,i exp
(
−αbi t
)
σt,i/θ2, where α
b
i and θ2 are
parameters given by RICE, and b0,i is the initial backstop price in region i.
Let Ŷt,i denote the output net of climate damage, mitigation expenditure and
adaptation cost, that is, Ŷt,i = Yt,i −Ψt,i −Υt,i.
2.3.4 Economic Interactions between Regions
In the economic system, each region’s stock of capital is the state variable Kt,i. Its
law of motion is:
Kt+1,i = (1− δ)Kt,i + It,i, (13)
10We use the business-as-usual (BAU) results (i.e., with µt,i ≡ 0) of RICE to estimate the carbon
intensity paths. We first estimate EIndt,i and Yt,i under BAU by summing over those in RICE
subregions located in our region i for each time t, and then compute the carbon intensity paths
σt,i = E
Ind
t,i /Yt,i for region i.
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where δ = 0.1 is the depreciation rate and It,i is investment in region i. We model
the economic interactions between two regions with the following adjustment cost
function:
Γt,i ≡
B
2
Ŷt,i
(
It,i + ct,iLt,i
Ŷt,i
− 1
)2
, (14)
where B is the intensity of the friction, and ct,i is per capita consumption in region
i. The open economy situation corresponds to B = 0, while a large B approximates
the closed economy with Ŷt,i = It,i + ct,iLt,i (note that Γt,i = 0 could be caused
by either the open economy or the closed economy, so we use B = 0 and large
B to distinguish the two cases). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) discuss border
barriers and how costly they are. Similar adjustment cost functions have been used
in Goulder et al. (2016). The economic interaction cost also includes the cost of
avoiding carbon leakage between two regions. Eaton and Kortum (2002) find that if
all countries (in their data set) collectively remove tariffs, then most countries will
gain around 1% of output with mobile labor, and less than 0.5% with immobile labor.
Since we assume mobile labor within each region but immobile between two regions,
we estimate the economic interaction cost to be roughly 0.5% of output for each region
and use this to calibrate B.
The market clearing condition with adjustment costs becomes
2∑
i=1
(It,i + ct,iLt,i + Γt,i) =
2∑
i=1
Ŷt,i. (15)
3 Social Planner versus Nash Equilibrium
We use the Epstein–Zin preference (Epstein and Zin, 1989) to isolate the IES and
risk aversion for our stochastic models under cooperation (a social planner’s model)
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or noncooperation (a dynamic stochastic game) between the regions.
3.1 Social Planner’s Model
With time separable utilities, a social planner maximizes the sum of discounted ex-
pected regional utilities subject to economic and climatic constraints for time sepa-
rable utilities. Using the recursive utility, we use a transformation similar to that in
Cai et al. (forthcoming) and then solve the Bellman equation:
V SPt (xt) = max
at

2∑
i=1
u(ct,i)Lt,i +
β
1− 1
ψ
[
Et
(((
1−
1
ψ
)
V SPt+1(xt+1)
)Θ)]1/Θ ,
(16)
subject to (1), (3)-(4), (6)-(7), (12)-(13), and (15), where
xt = (Kt,1, Kt,2,M
AT
t ,M
UO
t ,M
DO
t , T
AT
t,1 , T
AT
t,2 , T
OC
t , St, Jt, χt) (17)
is the vector of eleven state variables (the first ten variables are continuous), at =
(It,1, It,2, ct,1, ct,2, µt,1, µt,2, Pt,1, Pt,2) is the vector of decision variables (all are contin-
uous), Et is the expectation operator conditional on the time-t information, β is the
discount factor, u is a per capita utility function: u(c) = c(1−1/ψ)/(1 − 1/ψ),with ψ
the IES, and Θ = (1 − γ)/(1 − 1/ψ) with γ the risk aversion parameter. If ψγ = 1,
then the recursive utility becomes time separable, and (16) becomes a standard Bell-
man equation. We use annual time steps, where the initial year (t = 0) is 2015,
and the terminal time (t = T = 300) is the year 2315. The terminal value function
V SPT (xT ) is computed as shown in Appendix A.7. We use ψ = 1.5 and γ = 3.066 as
in Pindyck and Wang (2013) for our benchmark stochastic case. We use the parallel
dynamic programming method (Cai et al., 2015) with simplicial complete Cheby-
shev polynomial approximation (Cai et al., 2018a) and time-varying approximation
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domains (Cai, forthcoming) on the Blue Waters supercomputer to solve the social
planner’s problem. The computational method has been applied successfully to solve
DSICE (Cai et al., 2016, forthcoming).
3.2 Feedback Nash Equilibrium
A non-cooperative world can be described as a situation in which each region acts
a separate social planner and chooses emissions paths to maximize its own welfare
subject to the relevant economic and climatic constraints and by taking emission of
the other region as given. For this dynamic game two solution concepts are studied
in the literature, the open loop Nash equilibrium and the feedback Nash equilibrium
(FBNE). As is well known, the open loop Nash equilibrium does not possess the
Markov perfect property and is not robust against unexpected changes in the state
of the system. Therefore, the FBNE is considered to be a more satisfactory solution
concept.
We derive the FBNE in a dynamic programming framework (e.g. Basar and Olsder
1999), so that the controls of each region depend on the states, and the solution is
a Markov perfect non-cooperative regional equilibrium by construction. As shown
in Appendix A.5 in our regional FBNE there is no transfer of capital between the
regions, so the market clearing condition (15) is changed to
It,i + ct,iLt,i = Ŷt,i (18)
for i = 1, 2, and then adjustment costs Γt,i are zero, so we can rewrite the transition
laws of capital as
Kt+1,i = (1− δ)Kt,i + Ŷt,i − ct,iLt,i (19)
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after the substitution of It.i.
The FBNE is solved for a nonlinear dynamic stochastic programming problem,
with recursive preferences, without symmetry, and regional feedback strategies which
depend on a vector of eleven state variables (ten of which are continuous). We solve
the following system of two Bellman equations:
V FBNEt,i (xt) = max
ct,i,Pt,i,µt,i
{u(ct,i)Lt,i + βGt,i(xt+1)} , (20)
subject to
xt+1 = ft(xt, a
FBNE
t , ωt) (21)
for i = 1, 2, where xt is the vector of state variables defined in (17), a
FBNE
t =
(ct,1, ct,2, µt,1, µt,2, Pt,1, Pt,2) is the vector of decision variables for the FBNE,
Gt,i(xt+1) ≡
1
1− 1
ψ
[
Et
(((
1−
1
ψ
)
V FBNEt+1,i (xt+1)
)Θ)]1/Θ
, (22)
and ft represents the vector of the transition laws of state variables: (1), (3), (4), (6),
(7), and (19) for i = 1, 2.
For each i, the maximization problem in (20) has only three decisions: ct,i, Pt,i, µt,i.
Thus, for an interior solution,11 we have the system of first-order conditions (FOCs)
of (20) over ct,i, Pt,i, µt,i:
FOCt(xt, a
FBNE
t ,xt+1) = 0 (23)
which contains six equations provided in Appendix A.4. After we substitute xt+1 by
ft(xt, a
FBNE
t , ωt), for each current-period state xt, the system (23) has six equations
and six unknowns aFBNEt , so we can solve it to find a solution. We then use the
11If there is a binding constraint, then we just need to add its associated complementarity condi-
tion.
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solution to compute the FBNE value functions V FBNEt,i (xt) = u(ct,i)Lt,i + βGt,i(xt+1),
for i = 1, 2.
3.3 Social Cost of Carbon and Carbon Tax
In Nordhaus (2017), the regional social cost of carbon (SCC) is defined to be the
present value of future damages in a region caused by one extra ton of global carbon
emissions in the current period. While the global SCC is equal to the optimal global
carbon tax (see Cai et al. (forthcoming)), we cannot derive that the optimal regional
carbon tax is equal to the regional SCC, as the global SCC is the sum of regional
SCCs over all regions but the global carbon tax cannot be the sum of regional carbon
taxes.
In a cooperative world, we follow van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (2016) and Cai et al.
(forthcoming) to define the regional cooperative SCC:
τSPt,i = −1000
(
∂V SPt
∂MATt
)/(
∂V SPt
∂Kt,i
)
which is equal to the optimal regional carbon tax in the cooperative world if the
emission control rate does not hit its bound (Cai et al., forthcoming). If the economy
is open, that is, the adjustment cost of border friction is zero (i.e., B = 0), then the
regional carbon tax is the same across regions as the marginal return of capital will
be the same across regions. However, if there is nonzero friction cost between regions
or even the economy is closed, then the regional carbon tax is different across regions.
In a non-cooperative world, we follow van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (2016) and
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Cai et al. (forthcoming) to define the regional non-cooperative SCC:
τFBNEt,i = −1000
(
∂V FBNEt,i
∂MATt
)/(
∂V FBNEt,i
∂Kt,i
)
which is equal to the optimal regional carbon tax in FBNE if the emission control
rate is not binding at its bound (Cai et al., forthcoming). Since the economy is closed
in the FBNE, the regional carbon tax is different across regions.
4 Computational Method for Solving FBNE
In the literature for solving discrete time FBNE with continuous state and control
variables, there are two popular methods. One is the projection method (Judd, 1992,
1998), which is first applied by Rui and Miranda (1996) to solve nonlinear dynamic
games. Another is the discretization method, that is, we discretize state and control
variables and then implement the Pakes-McGuire method (Pakes and McGuire, 1994)
or its variants (e.g., Cai et al. 2018b). But the projection method is only for solving
infinite-horizon stationary problems, and the discretization method can only work for
low-dimensional problems due to the curse-of-dimensionality.
In this section we introduce a new time backward iteration method to solve FBNE
in general cases including finite-horizon nonstationary problems with multiple players
i ∈ I where I represent the set of players. In this study, we have two players (one
player per region). The value functions for our problems are continuous for each
discrete state and each player, and almost everywhere differentiable in the continuous
state variables. For each player i, we approximate its value function V FBNEi (x) using a
functional form Vˆ (x;bi) with a finite number of parameters, bi, where x is the vector
of state variables. In our study, x represents the eleven-dimensional vector defined in
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(17). The functional form Vˆ may be a linear combination of polynomials, a rational
function, or a neural net. Detailed discussion of approximation methods can be found
in Judd (1998), Miranda and Fackler (2002), and Cai (forthcoming). In this study, we
choose simplicial complete Chebyshev polynomial approximation (Cai et al., 2018a).
After the functional form is set, at each time t, we find {bt,i : i ∈ I} such that
{Vˆt,i(x;bt,i) : i ∈ I} approximately solve the following general Bellman equations
simulataneously:
V FBNEt,i (x) = max
a∈D(x,t)
ut,i(x, a) + βGt,i (x+) , (24)
s.t. x+ = ft(x, a, ω),
for all i ∈ I such that Vˆt,i(x;bt,i) ≈ V
FBNE
t,i (x). Here V
FBNE
t,i (x) is the value function of
player i at time t ≤ T (the terminal value function V FBNET,i (x) is given), x+ is the next-
stage state, D(x, t) is a feasible set of a, ω is a random variable vector, ft is the vector
of the transition laws of x, β is a discount factor and ut,i(x, a) is the utility function
of player i (in this study, ut,i(x, a) = u(ct,i)Lt,i), and Gt,i is a function generated from
Vt+1,i, which can be written as Gt,i ≡ Ht
(
V FBNEt+1,i
)
where Ht is a functional operator.
A typical functional operator is Et, the expectation operator conditional on time-t
information. In this study, Ht is defined in a way such that Gt,i has the form defined
in (22).
To solve the system of maximization problems (24), we transform them to solve
a system of FOCs (for an interior solution):
∇a (ut,i(x, a) + βGt,i (ft(x, a, ω))) = 0, i ∈ I, (25)
where ∇a is the gradient vector over a. In our study, it corresponds to the system
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(23) after the next-period state is substituted by the transition functions according
to (21). However, it is often challenging to find a solution of the system (25), in
particular, when it includes complementarity conditions for a solution binding at an
inequality constraint, or when x is near to or on the border of approximation domains.
Thus, we instead solve the following minimization model
min
∑
i∈I
‖ǫi‖ , (26)
s.t. ∇a (ut,i(x, a) + βGt,i (ft(x, a, ω))) = ǫi, i ∈ I,
a ∈ D(x, t),
‖ǫi‖ ≤ ǫ¯, i ∈ I,
where ǫi is a vector, ǫ¯ is a given small positive number for guaranteeing that the left
hand side of (25) is close to zero, and ‖·‖ is a norm. If ‖·‖ is the L1 norm, then
there are kinks which create challenges for optimization. Appendix A.6 describes
computational techniques to overcome the kink problem.
The following is our new algorithm with time backward iteration for solving FBNE
of finite horizon problems.
Algorithm 1. Time Backward Iteration for Solving FBNE
Initialization. Choose the time-varying approximation nodes, Xt = {xt,j : 1 ≤
j ≤ mt} for every t < T , and choose a functional form for Vˆ (x;b). Let
VˆT,i(x;bT,i) ≡ V
FBNE
T,i (x). Then for t = T −1, T −2, . . . , 0, iterate through steps
1 and 2.
Step 1. Minimization step. For each approximation node xt,j, solve (26) to find the
optimal solution a∗ and compute vi,j = ut,i(xt,j, a
∗) + βGt,i (ft(xt,j, a
∗, ω)) for
each i ∈ I. Here Gt,i ≡ Ht
(
Vˆt+1,i
)
.
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Step 2. Fitting step. Using an appropriate approximation method, compute the bt,i
such that Vˆt,i(x;bt,i) approximates {(xt,j , vi,j) : 1 ≤ j ≤ mt}, i.e., Vˆt,i(xt,j;bt,i) ≈
vi,j, for every i ∈ I and 1 ≤ j ≤ mt.
Note that the minimization step can be easily parallelized over i ∈ I and 1 ≤ j ≤ mt.
Thus, we can also use the Master-Worker framework of the parallel dynamic program-
ming in Cai et al. (2015) to implement parallism on Algorithm 1, and can reach the
similar parallelism efficiency. In this study, the terminal value functions V FBNET,i (xT )
are computed as shown in Appendix A.7. Since the state space is high-dimensional,
we require a large number of approximation nodes {xt,j}, so we implement parallelism
across xt,j and i ∈ I on the Blue Waters supercomputer to find FBNE.
While Algorithm 1 solves finite-horizon problems, it is simple to adapt it to solve
infinite-horizon stationary problems, in which we use time-invariant approximation
domains and nodes. We can just replace the T iterations by the unlimited number
of iterations with the following stopping criterion: the difference between two consec-
utive value functions for every player is small enough. See Cai (forthcoming) for a
discussion about stopping criteria.
To validate Algorithm 1, we first implement it (after being adapted for infinite-
horizon stationary problems) to solve a linear-quadratic differential game given in
Engwerda (2009): its example 4.6. The game has three FBNEs. We first discretize
time to change it to be a discrete time problem and then implement our algorithm.
We find that it converges to one of three FBNEs. We also employ Algorithm 1
(after being adapted for infinite-horizon stationary problems) to solve the dynamic
stochastic games in international commodity markets in Rui and Miranda (1996), and
find that it provides solutions close to those in Rui and Miranda (1996). Thus, we
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Figure 2: Regional Carbon Tax
see that our time backward iteration can find FBNE, at least one if it exists. In our
study, it might have only a unique FBNE for each case although we cannot prove it
in theory.
5 Results
We solve the Bellman equations (16) and (20) with ψ = 1.5 and γ = 3.066 as our
default utility preference values. After we solve the Bellman equations, we use the
optimal policy functions to generate 10,000 simulation paths forward. That is, each
simulation path starts at the observed initial states, we simulate one sample of the
shock for the tipping point at time t, and then with the realized sample and the
optimal control policy at t, we obtain the optimal states at t+ 1.
The two left panels of Figure 2 show the distributions of the simulated regional
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carbon taxes for both regions under the social planner’s model, and the two right
panels of Figure 2 are for the feedback Nash equilibrium. All the panels in Figure
2, as well as in the following figures, include a line representing the deterministic
case derived with the same IES used in the stochastic model. The shaded area
represents the range of the 10,000 sample paths, along with the average, 1%, 2% and
5% quantile paths (that is, at each point in time, we compute the average and these
quantiles of 10,000 values). The initial regional carbon tax increases significantly
from the deterministic case to the stochastic case under either cooperation or non-
cooperation, and the FBNE solution has significantly less regional carbon taxes than
the cooperative solution. In the social planner’s problem, the initial regional carbon
tax for the stochastic case is $454/tC for the North and $318/tC for the Tropic-
South, about 2.3 times that of the corresponding deterministic case (with ψ = 1.5)
with cooperation in each region. In the FBNE, the initial regional carbon tax for
the stochastic case is $185/tC for the North and $152/tC for the Tropic-South, more
than double of that of the corresponding deterministic case of FBNE in each region,
but less than a half of the initial regional carbon tax of the social planner’s stochastic
case in each region.
Figure 3 shows the distributions of the optimal simulation paths for tipping dam-
age levels Jt and atmospheric carbon concentration under cooperation (the left panels)
and non-cooperation (the right panels). For the social planner’s problem, the cumu-
lative probability that the tipping event will occur before 2100 is only 9.6%, while
the 1%, 2% and 5% cumulative probability of tipping occurs in years 2035, 2047, and
2072 respectively. For the FBNE, the cumulative probability that the tipping event
will occur before 2100 increases to 10.7%, and the 2% or 5% cumulative probability
of tipping occurs at an earlier year. Once the tipping event happens, the regional
carbon tax immediately falls significantly, but damages unfold over a 50-year period,
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Figure 3: Tipping damage levels and atmospheric carbon concentration
as shown in the top panels for the tipping damage level Jt, under both cooperation
and non-cooperation. This happens because the high carbon tax before tipping is
intended to prevent or delay the tipping point as its occurrence depends on the con-
temporaneous temperature. However, after the tipping event happens, this incentive
disappears as the damage will unfold in a deterministic way. This result is consistent
with the finding in DSICE. The bottom panels show that, with the stricter mitigation
policy, the stochastic model has smaller carbon concentration in the atmosphere and
in 2100 it is on average 200 GtC less than the corresponding deterministic simulation
(with ψ = 1.5) for the cooperative case, and 100 GtC less than the corresponding
deterministic FNBE simulation for the noncooperative case. If the tipping event oc-
curs, then the carbon concentration has a higher rate of increase as the corresponding
mitigation policy is less strict.
Figure 4 shows the distributions of the optimal simulation paths for atmospheric
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Figure 4: Surface Temperature
temperatures in both regions for the cooperative (the left panels) and non-cooperative
(the right panels) cases. We see that the North has a much higher temperature
anomaly than the Tropic-South. Moreover, the atmospheric temperature anomaly
in the North is more than 2℃ higher than in the Tropic-South in 2100. The non-
cooperative case has higher temperatures than the cooperative case in both regions,
but narrower ranges in 2100.
Figure 5 shows the optimal adaptation rates in both regions for the cooperative
(the left panels) and non-cooperative (the right panels) cases. We see that the North
has lower adaptation rates than the Tropic-South, and that the stochastic results
have lower adaptation rates than the corresponding deterministic case, since with
the stricter mitigation policy and the resulting lower temperatures in the stochastic
case, there is less need to adapt. The non-cooperative case has higher adaptation
rates than the cooperative case in both regions, but narrower ranges in 2100. This
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Figure 5: Optimal Adaptation
adaptation policy has a direction between the regions opposite to the carbon tax
policy, because the optimal regional adaptation rate is a solution depending only on
the regional damage function, the regional mitigation cost function, and the regional
adaptation cost function. This can be seen by the FBNE’s first-order condition (A.4)
and (A.6), which also hold for the social planner’s problem. That is, adaptation has
no direct impact on the common good, carbon concentration. Thus, the cooperation
and non-cooperation have no direct impact on adaptation. But since the FBNE has
lower carbon tax, which leads to higher temperature and then higher damage, the
optimal adaptation is then higher.
5.1 Bias from Ignoring Heat Transport and PA
We examine the bias from ignoring heat and moisture transport and PA (i.e., ξ4 =
ξ5 = 0), shown in Figure 6, for the regional carbon tax under cooperation (the left
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panels) and non-cooperation (the right panels). In each panel of the figure, the
black lines represent the average paths and the red lines represent the solution paths
of the deterministic cases. The solid lines show the case with heat and moisture
transport and PA, while the dashed lines show the case without it. Figure 6 shows
that ignoring heat transport and PA underestimates the average regional carbon taxes
for both regions under cooperation and non-cooperation in the initial periods for the
stochastic results. For example, the initial regional carbon tax without PA is about
13% less than in the case with PA for both regions in the social planner’s model.
This is because ignoring heat transport leads to a lower temperature in the North
and then underestimates the tipping probability which depends on the atmospheric
temperature in the North. This lower tipping probability means a less risky tipping
element which leads to smaller regional carbon taxes. Note that in the deterministic
cases, ignoring heat transport has little impact on the regional carbon tax for the
social planner’s problem, but in the FBNE, the impact of ignoring heat and moisture
transport and PA is in the opposite direction for the regions: it underestimates the
regional carbon tax in the North, but a bit overestimates in the Tropic-South.
Figure 7 shows that in the social planner’s model ignoring heat transport and PA
significantly underestimates the atmospheric temperature anomaly and adaptation
rates in the North, and significantly overestimates them in the Tropic-South. The
FBNE model has similar pattern so here we omit its figure.
5.2 Bias from Ignoring SLR, Adaptation, and Capital Transfer
Table 1 lists the initial regional carbon tax if we ignore SLR, adaptation, or transfer
of capital between regions. Since the FBNE has no capital transfer between regions,
Table 1 lists only the cooperative solution. We see that ignoring SLR significantly un-
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Figure 6: Bias of Regional Carbon Taxes from Ignoring Heat Transport and PA
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Figure 7: Bias of Temperature and Adaptation from Ignoring Heat Transport and
PA
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derestimate the regional carbon taxes. For example, for the social planner’s stochastic
model without SLR, the initial regional carbon tax is $294/tC and $207/tC for the
North and the Tropic-South respectively, only about 65% of the corresponding ones
with SLR. This is because SLR imposes more damage, so it implies higher regional
carbon tax. Ignoring adaptation significantly overestimate the regional carbon taxes.
For example, for the social planner’s stochastic model without adaptation, the initial
regional carbon tax is $855/tC and $601/tC for the North and the Tropic-South re-
spectively, about 88% higher than the corresponding ones with adaptation. This is
because adaptation can reduce damages, so it can reduce regional carbon taxes. Ignor-
ing capital transfer (i.e., the closed economy) overestimates the regional carbon taxes
for the North and underestimates the regional carbon taxes for the Tropic-South. For
example, for the social planner’s stochastic model without capital transfer between
regions, the initial regional carbon tax is $540/tC for the North, about 19% higher
than the corresponding ones with capital transfer; and in the Tropic-South, the ini-
tial regional carbon tax is $275/tC without the capital transfer, about 14% less than
the one with the capital transfer. This happens because the capital transfer makes
the North to have less capital, then less output and less damages, so the North has
less regional carbon taxes; oppositely, the capital transfer makes the Tropic-South to
have more capital and then more output and more damages, so the Tropic-South has
higher regional carbon taxes. In addition, we also examine the impact of ignoring
permafrost thaw and find that it has little impact. The FBNE has the same pattern
with the social planner’s solutions for ignoring the elements. Table 1 also shows that
the initial regional carbon taxes in the FBNE are always significantly lower than the
ones in the cooperative world; the North always has higher regional carbon taxes than
the Tropic-South except the deterministic FBNE case without SLR; and the stochas-
tic cases always have higher regional carbon taxes than the deterministic cases, if we
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Table 1: Initial regional carbon tax from Ignoring Model Elements
Ignored Element Model Deterministic Stochastic
North Tropic-South North Tropic-South
SLR Coop. 84 58 294 207
FBNE 32 33 116 109
Adaptation Coop. 553 384 855 601
FBNE 355 214 400 299
Capital Transfer Coop. 236 118 540 275
Table 2: Initial regional carbon tax under various IESs (ψ) and risk aversion (γ)
IES Model Deterministic Stochastic
(ψ) North Tropic North Tropic-South
-South γ = 3.066 γ = 10 γ = 3.066 γ = 10
0.69 Coop. 58 35 114 132 69 80
FBNE 29 17 55 63 32 38
1.5 Coop. 198 137 454 519 318 363
FBNE 90 67 185 208 152 174
ignore SLR, adaptation, or transfer of capital between regions.
5.3 Sensitivity on IES and Risk Aversion
Different values of IES and risk aversion are used in the literature. Table 2 lists
the initial regional carbon tax for various IESs (ψ ∈ {0.69, 1.5}) and risk aversion
(γ ∈ {3.066, 10}). Table 2 shows that a higher IES leads to a higher regional carbon
tax in both regions; that a higher risk aversion leads to a higher regional carbon
tax in both regions; and that stochastic cases have a higher regional carbon tax
than deterministic cases for the same IES. This finding is consistent with Cai et al.
(forthcoming). Table 2 also shows that for all cases the North has a higher regional
carbon tax than the Tropic-South, and the regional carbon taxes in the FBNE are
always significantly smaller than the ones in the social planner’s solution.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has taken a first step toward adding heretofore neglected elements – heat
and moisture transport from the lower latitudes toward the Poles, sea level rise,
adaptation – into computational IAMs used in policy-relevant climate economics.
When our model is calibrated to data, we find substantial biases in key quantities
such as temperature anomalies, the regional carbon tax and damages, relative to the
case where a social planner neglects poleward heat and moisture transport, sea level
rise, and adaptation. We also show how potential arrival times of tipping elements in
the high latitudes are affected by the transport phenomena and, most importantly,
how these tipping elements can affect the regional carbon tax between the two regions.
In our DIRESCU model we have combined the neglected elements with stochastic
arrival of tipping points, cooperation and noncooperation between the North and
Tropic-South, and recursive preferences which distinguish between risk aversion and
the IES. We have shown that these aspects of our model have significant impact on
optimal climate policies, so they constitute an important step forward in calibrated
IAMs at the “coarse grained” level of aggregation. We have also shown that feedback
Nash equilibrium with recursive preferences can be computed in the complex high-
dimensional dynamic stochastic model with the advances of computational algorithms
and hardware resource.
We expect that future research and extensions in the context of our model – which
would involve a finer regional disaggregation, nonlinear surface albedo feedbacks, and
better approximations of damages from sources such as SLR or tipping points – could
provide additional and improved insights.
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A.1 Definition of Parameters and Exogenous Paths
In DIRESCU, we approximate the exogenous paths of DICE-2016 in five-year time
steps by their annual analogs. The land carbon emissions ELandt and exogenous ra-
diative forcing FEXt are defined below:
ELandt = 0.95e
−0.115t (A.1)
FEXt =
{
0.5 + 0.00588t, if t ≤ 85
1, otherwise.
(A.2)
Tables A.1-A.3 list the values and/or definition of all parameters, variables and
symbols.
A.1
Table A.1: Parameters, Variables and Symbols in the Deterministic Climate System
t time in years (t = 0 represents year 2015)
i∈ {1, 2} region i (North or Tropic-South)
MATt carbon concentration in the atmosphere (billion
tons); MAT0 = 851
MUOt carbon concentration in upper ocean (billion
tons); MUO0 = 460
MDOt carbon concentration in deep ocean (billion tons);
MDO0 = 1740
Mt =
(
MATt ,M
UO
t ,M
DO
t
)⊤
carbon concentration vector
TATt,i average surface temperature (Celsius);
TAT0,1 = 1.36, T
AT
0,2 = 0.765
TOCt average ocean temperature (Celsius);
TOC0 = 0.0068
Tt =
(
TATt,1 , T
AT
t,2 , T
OC
t
)⊤
temperature vector
St sea level rise (SLR); S0 = 0.14
Ft global radiative forcing
FEXt exogenous radiative forcing
η = 3.68 radiative forcing parameter
ΦM transition matrix of carbon cycle
ΦT transition matrix of temperature system
φ1,2 = 0.0237, φ2,1 = 0.0388 parameters in transition matrix of carbon cycle
φ2,3 = 0.00136, φ3,2 = 0.00284 parameters in transition matrix of carbon cycle
ξ1 = 0.0526, ξ2 = 0.08987 parameters in transition matrix of temperature
system
ξ3 = 0.0022, ξ4 = 0.6557 parameters in transition matrix of temperature
system
ξ5 = 0.5565, ξ6 = 0.0 parameters in transition matrix of temperature
system
ζSLR1 = 0.00073, ζ
SLR
2 = 1.4 parameters in SLR by warming
ζSLR3 = 0.007 parameters in SLR by warming
ζPerm1 = 1.951, ζ
Perm
2 = −0.0858 parameters in emission from permafrost thawing
by warming
ζPerm3 = 0.2257 parameters in emission from permafrost thawing
by warming
MAT∗ = 588 equilibrium atmospheric carbon concentration
A.2
Table A.2: Parameters, Variables and Symbols in the Economic System
Yt,i gross output
Yt,i output net of damage
Ŷt,i output net of damage, abatement and adaptation cost
At,i total productivity factor (TFP); A0,1 = 7.331, A0,2 = 3.582
αTFP1 = 0.013, α
TFP
2 = 0.0184 initial growth of TFP
dTFP1 = 0.0053, d
TFP
2 = 0.0061 change rate of growth of TFP
Lt,i population (in billions)
Kt,i capital (in $ trillions); K0,1 = 146, K0,2 = 77
α = 0.3 output elasticity of capital
DSt,i damage (in fraction of output) from sea level rise
π1,1 = 0.00447, π1,2 = 0.00408 SLR damage parameter
π2,1 = 0.01146, π2,2 = 0.00646 SLR damage parameter
DTt,i damage (in fraction of output) from surface temperature
anomaly
π3,1 = 0.00094, π3,2 = 0.00322 non-SLR damage parameter
π4,1 = 0.0002, π2,2 = 0.00074 non-SLR damage parameter
Ψt,i mitigation expenditure
Υt,i adaptation expenditure
µt,i emission control rate
Et, E
Ind
t,i , E
Land
t global emission; regional industrial emission; land emission
Pt,i adaptation rate
σt,i carbon intensity; σ0,1 = 0.094, σ0,2 = 0.104
ασ1 = 0.0156, α
σ
2 = 0.0181 initial declining rate of carbon intensity
dσ1 = 0.0063, d
σ
2 = 0.007 change rate of growth of carbon intensity
θ2 = 2.6 mitigation cost parameter
θ1,t,i adjusted cost for backstop
b0,1 = 1.71, b0,2 = 2.19 initial backstop price
αb1 = α
b
2 = 0.005 declining rate of backstop price
η1 = 0.115, η2 = 3.6 parameters for adaptation cost
δ = 0.1 annual depreciation rate
ct,i per capita consumption
It,i investment
Γt,i adjustment cost for economic interaction between regions
B = 1 parameter for economic interaction cost
ψ ∈ {0.69, 1.5} IES
u per capita utility function
β = 0.985 discount factor
A.3
Table A.3: Additional Parameters, Variables and Symbols in the Stochastic Model
D = 50 duration of tipping process
Jt damage level; J0 = 0
J = 0.15 final damage level
∆ annual increment of damage level
χt ∈ {0, 1} indicator for whether tipping has happened;
χ0 = 0
pt tipping probability
̺ = 0.00063 hazard rate for tipping
γ ∈ {3.066, 10} risk aversion parameter
xt vector of state variables
Vt value function at time t
V SPt value function for the social planner’s problem
V FBNEt value function for the feedback Nash equilibrium
problem
A.2 Calibration of the Climate System
Figure A.1 shows that our calibrated carbon cycle can approximate well for all sce-
narios except RCP8.5. Since RCP8.5 is the business-as-usual scenario, and our model
is solving problems with optimal mitigation policy, the deviation of approximation
for RCP8.5 has little impact on our solutions.
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Figure A.1: Fitting Atmospheric Carbon Concentration
Figure A.2 shows that our calibrated temperature system can approximate well for
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Figure A.2: Fitting Surface Temperature
all these scenarios. Figure A.3 displays the corresponding spatial surface temperature
and ocean temperature pathways from the calibrated temperature system, for the
RCP scenarios and the DICE-2016 optimal scenario. It also shows that the spatial
surface temperatures in 2081-2100 are close to the ones given in IPCC (2013).
Figure A.4 shows that our fitted paths of SLR (above the level in 2000) for
RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP6 are quite close to the mean projections in IPCC (2013)
and Kopp et al. (2014).
The left panel of Figure A.5 shows that our function (5) for estimating emissions
from thawing permafrost fits data well, and the right panel of Figure A.5 shows
projected future cumulative emission paths from thawing permafrost since 2010 for
four RCP scenarios. We see that the cumulative carbon emission under RCP8.5 is
also inside the likely range given in Schuur et al. (2015).12
A.3 Calibration of the Economic System
The left panel of Figure A.6 shows that our calibrated TFP paths match RICE
projections over both the North and the Tropic-South. The right panel of Figure A.6
12Since the amount of GHGs in permafrost is finite, we can have an upper bound constraint on
cumulative emissions from permafrost. But since our model solution never hits the upper bound,
numerically this constraint does not matter.
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Figure A.3: Spatial Temperature Using RCP or DICE Radiative Forcing Scenarios
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Figure A.4: Fitting SLR
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Figure A.5: Fitting the Carbon Emission Data from Thawing Permafrost and Pro-
jecting Future Cumulative Emission Paths from Thawing Permafrost since 2010
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Figure A.6: Fitting Total Factor Productivity (the left panel) and Carbon Intensity
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Figure A.7: Fitting SLR Damage (the left panel) and non-SLR Damage (the right
panel) to Output
shows that our carbon intensity estimate (11) closely approximates the corresponding
RICE projections.
The left panel of Figure A.7 shows that our estimate of SLR damage function (9)
is close to the RICE projection of SLR damage for both the North and the Tropic-
South. The right panel of Figure A.7 shows that our non-SLR damage functions (10)
fit the RICE projection of non-SLR damage in fraction of output.
A.8
A.4 First Order Conditions for FBNE
The system of first-order conditions (23) represents the following equations:
0 = u′(ct,i)− β
∂Gt,i(xt+1)
∂Kt+1,i
, i = 1, 2, (A.3)
0 =
∂Ŷt,i
∂Pt,i
, i = 1, 2, (A.4)
0 =
∂Gt,i(xt+1)
∂Kt+1,i
∂Ŷt,i
∂µt,i
+
∂Gt,i(xt+1)
∂MATt+1
∂EIndt,i
∂µt,i
, i = 1, 2, (A.5)
where we use
∂Kt+1,i
∂ct,i
= −Lt,i in deriving (A.3), and
∂Kt+1,i
∂Ŷt,i
= 1 and
∂MATt+1
∂EInd
t,i
= 1 in
deriving (A.5).
Here,
∂Gt,i(xt+1)
∂Kt+1,i
=
[
Et
((
V FBNEt+1,i (xt+1)
)Θ)]1/Θ−1
Et
((
V FBNEt+1,i (xt+1)
)Θ−1 ∂V FBNEt+1,i (xt+1)
∂Kt+1,i
)
∂Gt,i(xt+1)
∂MATt+1
=
[
Et
((
V FBNEt+1,i (xt+1)
)Θ)]1/Θ−1
Et
((
V FBNEt+1,i (xt+1)
)Θ−1 ∂V FBNEt+1,i (xt+1)
∂MATt+1
)
∂Ŷt,i
∂Pt,i
= Yt,i
[(
1− θ1,t,iµ
θ2
t,i − η1P
η2
t,i
)
Ωt,i(D
SLR
t,i +D
T
t,i)− η1η2P
η2−1
t,i
]
(A.6)
∂Ŷt,i
∂µt,i
= −θ1,t,iθ2µ
θ2−1
t,i Yt,i
∂EIndt,i
∂µt,i
= −σt,iYt,i
by assuming ψ > 1 for convenience. When ψ < 1, we just need to replace β by −β,
and V FBNEt+1,i by −V
FBNE
t+1,i in the equations.
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A.5 No Transfer of Capital in the FBNE
In the FBNE, region i chooses It,i, ct,i, µt,i, Pt,i, and migrated capital from the region
i to the other. Let ∆t,1 ≥ 0 be migrated capital from region 1 o 2, and ∆t,2 ≥ 0 from
region 2 o 1. Assume the IES ψ < 1 for convenience. The FBNE solves
Vt,i(xt) = max
It,i,ct,i,µt,i,Pt,i,∆t,i≥0
{u(ct,i)Lt,i + βGt,i(xt+1)} , (A.7)
for i = 1, 2, subject to the transition laws (1), (3), (4), (13), (6), (7), and the following
region-specific market clearing constraint
It,1 + ct,1Lt,1 + Γt,1 −∆t,1 +∆t,2 = Ŷt,1 (A.8)
It,2 + ct,2Lt,2 + Γt,2 +∆t,1 −∆t,2 = Ŷt,2 (A.9)
respectively, where
Γt,i =
B
2
Ŷt,i
(
∆t,1 +∆t,2
Ŷt,i
)2
Let λt,i ≥ 0 be shadow prices for (A.8) and (A.9), and τt,i ≥ 0 for ∆t,i ≥ 0, for
i = 1, 2. Then from the KKT conditions of (A.7) for region i, we have
u′(ct,i) = λt,i
λt,i
(
1−
∂Γt,i
∂∆t,i
)
= τt,i
τt,i∆t,i = 0
Thus, since λt,i = u
′(ct,i) > 0 and
∂Γt,i
∂∆t,i
= B
∆t,1+∆t,2
Ŷt,i
< 1 (as B = 1 and it is impossible
to have ∆t,1+∆t,2 ≥ Yt,i due to our regional specification), we have τt,i > 0 and then
∆t,i = 0. That is, in the FBNE, there is no transfer of capital between the regions.
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A.6 L1 fitting
It is typical to choose the L1 norm in the minimization step of Algorithm 1. In this
case, we can avoid the kinks by transforming the minimization model (26) to
min
∑
i,k
(ǫ′i,1,k + ǫ
′
i,2,k), (A.10)
s.t. ∇a (ut,i(x, a) + βGt,i (Ht(x, a, ω))) = ǫ
′
i,1 − ǫ
′
i,2, i ∈ I,
a ∈ D(x, t),
0 ≤ ǫ′i,j,k ≤ ǫ¯
′, i ∈ I; j = 1, 2; k = 1, ..., n,
where ǫ′i,1, ǫ
′
i,2 are length-n nonnegative vectors, ǫ
′
i,1,k, ǫ
′
i,2,k are their elements, and ǫ¯
′
is a small positive number. To reduce computational time, we may instead solve the
following problem
min
∑
i,k
ǫ′′i,k, (A.11)
s.t. ∇a (ut,i(x, a) + βGt,i (Ht(x, a, ω))) = ǫ
′′
i , i ∈ I,
a ∈ D(x, t),
0 ≤ ǫ′′i,k ≤ ǫ¯
′′, i ∈ I; k = 1, ..., n
where ǫ′′i is a length-n nonnegative vector, ǫ
′′
i,k are its elements, and ǫ¯
′′ is a small
positive number.
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A.7 Terminal Value Function
For the social planner’s problem, the terminal value function at the terminal time
T = 300 (i.e., year 2315) is computed as
V SPT (xT ) =
2∑
i=1
600∑
t=300
βt−300u(ct,i)LT,i,
where we assume that for all t > T , all exogenous paths stop changing and fix
their values at terminal time T . Emission control rates are always 1 (i.e., µt,i = 1),
adaptation rates are fixed at a constant level, there are no economic interaction costs
(i.e., Γt,i = 0), and both ct,iLt,i/Yt,i and It,i/Yt,i are given constant values. Moreover,
we assume that if the tipping event has not happened before T , then it never happens;
or if the tipping event has happened, then its damage will unfold until its maximum
level.
For the FBNE, the terminal value functions at T = 300 are computed as
V FBNET,i (xT ) =
600∑
t=300
βt−300u(ct,i)LT,i
for i = 1, 2, under the same assumptions of the social planner’s problem for periods
after T = 300. In both cooperative and noncooperative cases, consideration of al-
ternatives showed that changes in the terminal value functions at year 2315 had no
significant impact on any results for the twenty-first century.
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